The exact relation between the sense that one's body is one's own (body-ownership) and the sense that one controls one's own bodily actions (agency) has been the focus of much speculation, but remains unclear. On an 'additive' model, agency and body-ownership are strongly related; the ability to control actions is a powerful cue to body-ownership. This view implies a component common to the senses of body-ownership and agency, plus possible additional components unique to agency. An alternative 'independence' model holds that agency and body-ownership are qualitatively different experiences, triggered by different inputs, and recruiting distinct brain networks. We tested these two specific models by investigating the sensory and motor aspects of body-representation in the brain using fMRI. Activations in midline cortical structures were associated with a sensory-driven sense of body-ownership, and were absent in agency conditions. Activity in the pre-SMA was linked to the sense of agency, but distinct from the sense of body-ownership. No shared activations that would support the additive model were found. The results support the independence model. Body-ownership involves a psychophysiological baseline, linked to activation of the brain's default mode network. Agency is linked to premotor and parietal areas involved in generating motor intentions and subsequent action monitoring.
Introduction
The basic embodied sense of self is a complex conscious state, with several dissociable components (Longo, Schüür, Kammers, Tsakiris, & Haggard, 2008) . Among these are the sense of ownership of one's body (i.e., body-ownership), and also the sense of agency over one's own actions (Tsakiris, Hesse, Boy, Haggard, & Fink, 2007; Tsakiris, Schütz-Bosbach, & Gallagher, 2007) . The feeling that the body I inhabit is 'my own', and ever-present in my mental life, is called body-ownership (Tsakiris, 2010) . My body is an integral part of 'me', in a way that other objects are not. Moreover, the relation between my body and 'me' is quite different from the relation between my body and other people (Descartes, 1637 (Descartes, /2006 ). In contrast, the feeling that I can move and control my body is called the sense of agency. The sense of agency gives a special phenomenal quality to self-generated motor actions and external events caused by those actions. For example, the relationship between my actions and 'me' differs from the relation between observed actions carried out by other agents or without my voluntary control (de Vignemont & Fourneret, 2004) .
The sense of body-ownership is normally continuous and omnipresent. Thus, we experience body-ownership not only during voluntary actions, but also during passive movement and at rest (van den Bos & Jeannerod, 2002) . In contrast, only voluntary actions should produce a sense of agency. Several studies confirm that agency is closely linked to the generation of efferent motor signals and the monitoring of their effects (e.g., Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002) . In contrast, the sense of body-ownership can be induced by afferent sensory signals alone (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998) . However, the exact relation between agency and body-ownership remains unknown. On one view, the relation between agency and body-ownership is additive, meaning that agency entails body-ownership. This view follows from the observation that one can control movements of one's own body, but not other objects, at will (Descartes, 1637 (Descartes, /2006 . Thus, agency offers a strong cue to body-ownership. On this view, the sense of agency should involve the sense of body-ownership, plus a possible additional experience of voluntary control. An alternative view holds that sense of agency and sense of body-ownership are qualitatively different experiences, without any common component.
Previous accounts based on introspective evidence favour the additive model, since they identified a common sense of bodyownership, plus an additional component unique to action control
